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Bragdon v. Abbott: Is Asymptomatic HIV a
Per Se Disability Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act?

In Bragdon v. Abbott,1 the United States Supreme Court held that
asymptomatic HIV is a "disability" under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")2 because it is a physical impairment that substantially
limits the major life activity of reproduction.' It further held that
determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief requires objective
and particularized evidence of the risks to the defendant under the
"direct threat" provisions of the ADA.4 This Casenote focuses exclusively on the "disability" holding.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 16, 1994, Sidney Abbott went to Dr. Randon Bragdon's
dental office in Bangor, Maine, for a dental appointment. She reported
her HIV-positive status on the patient registration form and Dr. Bragdon
During the exam Dr. Bragdon found a cavity and
examined her.5
informed Ms. Abbott of his policy against filling cavities of HIV-infected
patients in his office. He offered to fill the cavity at a hospital with no
added fee for his services. Ms. Abbott would, however, be charged for
using the hospital's facilities. Ms. Abbott declined. 6
Ms. Abbott sued Dr. Bragdon under state law and ADA Title III's
Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Citizens

1. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (5-4 decision on "disability," 6-3 decision on the "direct threat"
provision).
2. Id. at 2205, 2206.
3. Id. at 2206.
4. Id. at 1213. 42 U.S.C §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
5. Id. at 2201. Ms. Abbott became infected with HIV in 1986 and, at the time this
incident occurred, she was primarily asymptomatic. Id. at 2200-01.
6. Id. Although Petitioner represented to Ms. Abbott that he would treat her in a
hospital setting if she paid the extra charges, he had not applied for privileges at a
hospital. After Ms. Abbott filed her complaint against Dr. Bragdon, he applied for, but
never received, privileges at a hospital two hours away. See Brief for Respondent Sidney
Abbott, 1998 WL47514, at *3, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (No. 97-156).
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section.7 She alleged discrimination based on her disability-HIV
infection. 8 The United States and the Maine Human Rights Commission intervened as plaintiffs, and the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. ' The district court granted summary judgment for
plaintiffs, holding that Ms. Abbott's asymptomatic HIV satisfied the
ADA definition of disability because it substantially limited her major
life activity of reproduction.' ° As to the first prong of the ADA definition of a "disability," the district court, relying on the regulatory
guidelines and judicial authority, concluded that asymptomatic HIV is
a physical impairment.11
The court, however, was more troubled by the second and third prongs
of the analysis-whether plaintiff's asymptomatic HIV "substantially
limits" one or more of her "major life activities." 2 The district court
concurred with a majority of courts that "[rieproduction, one of the most
fundamental of human activities, must constitute a major life activity."" The court was not persuaded that the regulations' failure to
mention reproduction as a major life activity was dispositive on that
issue; rather, it reasoned that the regulation is illustrative of major life
activities, not an exhaustive list. 4 Finally, the court relied on Ms.
Abbott's statements in her deposition that fear of harm to her immune
system, the risks of infecting her child, and the possibility of her child
being motherless were all factors establishing that her asymptomatic
HIV substantially limited her major life activity of reproduction. ' s
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
grant of summary judgment.'6 The court's reasoning was very similar
to the district court regarding the "physical impairment" prong of the

7. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides: "No individual shall
be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation."
8. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
9. Id.
10. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D. Me. 1995).
11. Id. at 585. The court cited the following cases as supporting the proposition that
HIV is a physical impairment within the meaning of the ADA: Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d
1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990); EEOC v.
Chemtech Int'l Corp., No. H-94-2848, 1995 WL 608355, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1995).
12. Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 586-87.
13. Id. at 586.
14. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998) which states: "The phrase mqjor life activities
means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.").
15. Id. at 587.
16. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 949 (1st Cir. 1997).
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analysis. The court held "unhesitatingly that HIV-positive status,
simpliciter, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, comprises a physical
impairment under the ADA."1" Likewise, the court found that reproduction was a major life activity, citing societal norms, congressional
intent, and the plain meaning of the words in the statute."8 The final
hurdle, whether Ms. Abbott's impairment substantially limited that
major life activity, was leaped without the individualized inquiry usually
followed in ADA claims. Relying on empirical statistics rather than Ms.
Abbott's contentions about the particular consequences she experienced,
the court held that Ms. Abbott's HIV substantially limits her ability to
reproduce. 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed,
holding that asymptomatic HIV is a disability that substantially limits
the major life activity of reproduction.20
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Prior to the ADA, the primary legislation prohibiting discrimination
against the disabled was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RHA"). 21 The
RHA prohibits discrimination against "handicapped" persons participating in federally funded programs.22 The RHA definition of "handicapped"23 is mirrored almost verbatim in the RHA's successor, the ADA.
The ADA defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual."24 The similarities are so significant, and the purposes so
intertwined, that Congress included a statutory provision directing that

17. Id. at 939.
18. Id. at 939-40 (citing a dictionary definition of "major" to support the position that
the statute plainly means an activity of "greater than others in importance or rank").
19. Id. at 942-43. The court noted that an HIV-positive woman faces an approximate
twenty-five percent risk of transmitting the virus to her child without AZT and an eight
percent risk with AZT. Accordingly, the court held that "[n]o reasonable juror could
conclude that an eight percent risk of passing an incurable, debilitating, and inevitably
fatal disease to one's child is not a substantial restriction on reproductive activity." Id. at
942.
20. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1976).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 701.
23. The RHA defines "handicapped" as an individual who "has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities."
29 U.S.C. § 705(20). A person is also handicapped if he "has a record of such an
impairment" or "is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(6).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
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case law and regulations promulgated under the RHA should apply
when interpreting the ADA.25
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") issued
the first RHA regulations in 1977.26 These regulations were duplicated,
without change, by the Department of Health and Human Services and
define "physical or mental impairment" as "any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respitory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin, and
endocrine ....,,27This definition has been adopted by the current
regulations promulgated for use with the ADA as well.28
Courts first considered discrimination against people with HIV under
the RHA. Every reported decision from the mid-1980s until the passage
of the ADA in 1990 found that AIDS and asymptomatic HIV infection
were handicaps within the meaning of the RHA or relevant state
statutes.29 Many of these cases did so without discussing how the
individual's condition fell within the act.30 In 1987 the Supreme Court
first addressed whether a contagious disease was a disability under
Section 504 of the RHA in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.3 1
While the Court specifically declined to decide whether AIDS was a
"physical impairment,"32 it held that tuberculosis was a disability under
the RHA.33 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, reasoned that
tuberculosis is a disability because it affects the respiratory system, a
system included in the Health and Human Services regulation's
definition.34

25. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) states, "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than ... under Title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et. seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to such title."
26. 3 C.F.R. § 117 (1976-1980 Comp.).
27. 45 C.F.R § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1998). The regulations issued by the Justice Department

(the department currently responsible for enforcing Titles II and III of the ADA) adopted
the HEW definition of physical impairment. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (1998).
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998) (Title I EEOC regulations) and 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.104(1)(i) (1998) (Title II and Title III Department of Justice regulations).
29. See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact
of the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 16-17 (1997) (listing federal
and state cases that found HIV to be a disability under the Rehabilitation Act).
30. Id. at 16.
31. 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987).
32. Id. at 282 n.7.
33. Id. at 289.
34. Id. at 281.
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Without a definitive answer by the Supreme Court on whether
asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the RHA or the ADA, the circuit
courts split. In Gates v. Rowland,35 the Ninth Circuit held that HIVpositive inmates were entitled to protection against discrimination by
prison officials.3" Although the action was brought, in part, under the
RHA, the court cited and discussed the term "disability" as it is used in
the ADA. 37 The court deferred to the Department of Justice regulation
implementing the ADA, which specifically includes "HIV disease
(whether symptomatic or asymptomatic)" as a physical impairment. 38
The court's holding was very broad in that it did not require an
individualized assessment of each plaintiff to find that asymptomatic
HIV was a disability. Rather, it simply held "that a person infected with
the HIV virus is an individual with a disability within the meaning of
the Act." 9 The lower court opinions in Bragdon mirror this categorical
approach to the disability question.
In accordance with ADA analysis in areas other than HIV,the Fourth
Circuit adopted a much narrower, more individualized standard. In
Ennis v. National Association of Business and Educational Radio,
Inc.,4 the court held that "the plain language of [the ADA] requires
that a finding of disability be made on an individual-by-individual
basis."4' This distinction is significant because ADA decisions typically
require plaintiffs to prove how their disability significantly limits a
major life activity. In Ennis the court declined to find that plaintiff's
asymptomatic son had a per se disability,42 stating that plaintiff must
prove how her son's
HIV-positive status substantially limited a specified
43
major life activity.

Reaffirming Ennis, the en banc Fourth Circuit held in Runnebaum v.
NationsBank of Maryland" "[t]he plain meaning of 'impairment'
suggests that asymptomatic HIV infection will never qualify as an

35. 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
36. Id. at 1446.
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(4)(1)(ii) (1998)).
39. Id.
40. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
41. Id, at 59.
42. Id. at 60. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4), which prohibits employers
from discriminating against an employee because "ofthe known disability of a person with
whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association." Id. at 59.
Plaintiff alleged that she was fired because her employer knew of her HIV-positive son and
feared increased medical insurance premiums. Id. at 57.
43. Id. at 60.
44. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'g 95 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1996).
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impairment: by definition, asymptomatic HIV infection exhibits no
diminishing effects on the individual."45 The court did, however,
temper that assertion by observing that a case-by-case, individualized
assessment of a party's particular impairment should be made.46 The
court held, unconditionally, that HIV does not substantially limit either
procreation or intimate relations. 7
Thus, the circuits were split on when and whether asymptomatic HIV
is an impairment covered under the ADA and, if so covered, whether
reproduction qualifies as a substantial life activity that an impairment
might substantially limit. Bragdon v. Abbott gave positive categorical
answers to both questions.
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, subdivided the disability
analysis into three basic questions: (1) whether respondent's HIV
infection was a physical impairment, (2) whether reproduction or child
bearing, upon which respondent relied, constitutes a major life activity,
and (3) whether such an impairment substantially limited that major life
activity.4" In construing these questions under the ADA, the Court was
"informed" by interpretations of parallel definitions in the RHA and its
regulations and agency interpretations.49
The Court began by examining the ADA's definition of disability in
light of its history under the RHA. ° The majority asserted that
Congress's repetition of the substantive definition of "handicap,"
contained in the RHA, equates with the ADA term "disability" and
carries the implication that "Congress intended the term to be construed
in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.""' This view
is supported by case law52 and the provision in the ADA 3 that "'nothing... shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards

45. 123 F.3d at 169.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 172. The court reasoned that HIV-infected people are not unable to procreate
or engage in sexual intimacies; rather, they may choose not to for fear of infecting their
partner or fetus. Id. The court was not satisfied that choosing to refrain fits within the
statutory language of "substantially limits" because there is nothing physically limiting the
activities. Id.
48. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See FDIC v, Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1986) (holding that
repition of a pre-existing statutory term in a new statute implies Congress intended that
term to be interpretted in accordance with the pre-existing term).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).
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applied under ...the [RHA].'" 54 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
it is required to construe the ADA to provide at least as much protection
as the regulations implementing the RHA. s
The Court first determined that Ms. Abbott had a physical impairment
by turning to the HEW regulations under the RHA."6 These regulations appear without change in the current regulations issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services and by the Department of
Justice.5" The regulations define "physical or mental impairment" as,
among many other things, a "physiological disorder ... affecting ...
Interestingly, the Court
[the] hemic and lymphatic" systems.5 8
observed that the 1977 regulations did not mention HIV among the
specific disorders that constitute a physical impairment. 9 However,
the majority failed to mention the modern Department of Justice regulations, which do specifically mention asymptomatic HIV as a physical
impairment, until it had already concluded its discussion of the
impairment prong of the analysis.60
The Court then recited the course the HIV retrovirus takes upon
infection of a human host paying special attention to the immediacy with
which the infection affects the body.61 Finally, the Court concluded
that HIV infection satisfies both the statute and the regulations from the
point of infection, reasoning that "[in light of the immediacy with which
the virus begins to damage the infected person's white blood cells and
the severity of the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the moment
physical
of infection."6 2 The Court also found that HIV is an ongoing
6
impairment with a physiological impact even in dormancy.
The second prong of the disability analysis requires that the HIVpositive impairment affect a major life activity.64 Ms. Abbott claimed
that her HIV infection substantially limited her ability to reproduce and

54. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (quoting § 12201(a)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 25.
58. 3 C.F.R. § 117; 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1).
59. 118 S. Ct. at 2203.
60. Id. at 2209.
61. Id. at 2203. Once the virus enters the body, the "assault on the immune system
is immediate," causing the victim to suffer sudden decline in CD4+ (lymphocytes).
Mononucleosis-like symptoms often emerge between six days and six weeks along with
several other outward manifestations of the illness. Id.
62. Id. at 2204.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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bear children. 5 Although Justice Kennedy mentioned in dicta that
reproduction is not the only major life activity affected by HIV that
would fall within the purview of the ADA, the opinion is limited to
reproduction because it was the only activity raised and considered in
the circuit court."6 Tracing the language of the court of appeals, the
majority had little difficulty concluding that reproduction is a major life
activity. 7 The Court held that reproduction is "major" because it is
"central to the life process itself."68 Dismissing Dr. Bragdon's claim
that Congress intended the ADA to cover only those aspects of a person's
life that are "public, economic, or daily [in] character," the Court
observed there is nothing "in the definition [which] suggests that
activities without a public, economic, or daily dimension may somehow
be regarded as so unimportant ...as to fall outside the meaning of the
word 'major.'"" The Court cited the illustrative, nonexhaustive list of
examples in the regulation to support the proposition that the statute is
to be read more broadly than suggested by Dr. Bragdon.7 ° Thus the
Court upheld the court
of appeals determination that reproduction is a
71
major life activity.
The final prong of the disability analysis is whether Ms. Abbott's
physical impairment substantially limited her participation in the major
life activity asserted. 2 At this point the Court found the RHA regulations were inconclusive and of no help in determining whether HIV
substantially limits reproduction.7 3 The majority held Ms. Abbott's
impairment substantially limited her participation in reproduction,
based not so much on the individualized evidence as on medical evidence
showing that HIV-positive status limits reproduction in two ways.74
First, the Court held significant the risk that an HIV-impaired person
would infect a sexual partner with HIV during the sexual relations
required for conception. 5 Second, the Court held that the fetus of an

65. Id. at 2205; see also Brief of the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents, 1998 WL 47248, at *20, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998) (No. 97-156) (explaining the profound impact HIV has on many major life activities).
66. 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2206.
75. Id. The Court stated, "The cumulative results of 13 studies collected in a 1994
textbook on AIDS indicates that 20% of male partners of women with HIV became HIVpositive themselves, with a majority of the studies finding a statistically significant risk
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infected woman is at risk for infection during gestation and at childbirth.76 Dr. Bragdon produced countervailing evidence that antiviral
therapy reduces the risk of transmission to the fetus to about eight
percent." However, the Court refused to find as a matter of law that
an eight percent risk of transmitting a "dread and fatal" disease to one's
child falls short of a substantial limitation on reproduction.7" Justice
Kennedy denied that the decision of an HIV infected person to reproduce
is a personal choice, citing the danger to the public health, economic
costs, and the laws of some states that prohibit persons with HIV from
having consensual sex.79 The majority supported this holding with
authority in the various agency interpretations"0 and the Department
of Justice regulations.8 '
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, filed
a dissenting opinion. The dissenters took issue with the majority's
categorical approach to defining disability."2 Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted the language of the statute states explicitly that the disability
determination is made "'with respect to an individual,'" stating "that
whether respondent has a disability covered by the ADA is an individualized inquiry."8 3 He asserted that "there is not a shred of record
evidence indicating that, prior to becoming infected with HIV, respondent's major life activities included reproduction." 4 In any event, the
dissent observed that "the Court is simply wrong in concluding as a

of infection."

Id. (citing Osmond & Padian, Sexual Transmition of HIV, in AIDS

KNOWLEDGE BASE 1.9-8 & tbl.2).

76. Id. The Solicitor General questioned the relevance of the seventeen percent
reduction in the risk of transmitting HIV to the fetus while being treated with AZT,
pointing to regulatory language requiring the substantiality of a limitation to be assessed
without regard to mitigating measures. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, 1998 WL 47255 at *18 n.10, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196
(1998) (No. 97-156).
77. Bragdon, 118 S.Ct. at 2206.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 2207. In support of its position, the Court points to a 1988 opinion
written by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice claiming that the RHA
"protects symptomatic HIV-infected and asymptomatic individuals against discrimination
in any covered program.'" Id. (quoting Memorandum to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel
to the President, Justice Department Application of Rehabilitation Act's Section 504 to
HIV-Infected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988)).
The Court also cited several administrative hearings under both the RHA and the ADA.
See 118 S.Ct. at 2207-08.
81. See 118 S.Ct. at 2209.
82. Id. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2214 (quoting 42 U.S. § 12102(2)).
84. Id. at 2214-15 (footnote omitted).
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The
general matter that reproduction is a 'major life activity.' 85
decision whether to reproduce, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, is
an important one, but is not the sort of activity covered by the list in the
RHA regulations.8 6
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Bragdon is an anomaly among ADA cases with respect to the Court's
methodology in determining whether a plaintiff has a "disability." Prior
to Bragdon, courts emphasized the individualized nature of the
"substantially limits a major life activity" portion of the disability
analysis. Plaintiffs had the burden of proving how their physical
impairments significantly limited their major life activities by a
preponderance of the evidence. 7 The Court in Bragdon did not follow
this approach; rather, relying on empirical evidence and general
theories, it concluded that plaintiff's major life activity of reproduction
was "substantially limited." 8 This method of analysis appears to be
limited to cases involving HIV, however, because the lower court cases
following Bragdon (not involving asymptomatic HIV) have continued the
individualized inquiry tradition on the third prong of the analysis.8 9
The circuit courts, since Bragdon, have continued to .employ an
individualized inquiry in deciding whether a plaintiff is disabled. The
Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have emphasized the
tripartite "disability analysis" set forth in Bragdon, but only two
acknowledge using Bragdon'sapproach to the "substantially limits a life
activity" prong. Accordingly, these courts appear either to have chosen
to interpret Bragdon as reaffirming the necessity of an individualized
inquiry, or instead to have continued to rely on the language in the
EEOC regulations that counsel the same approach.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have not relied on Bragdon for the
"substantially limits" prong of the "disability test." Instead, both courts
invoked the language of the EEOC regulations. In Cehrs v. Northeast
Ohio Alzheimer's Research Center,9 ° the Sixth Circuit held that
plaintiff's pustular psoriasis was a "physical impairment."9 ' It cited
Bragdon for the proposition that the ongoing nature of a disease and its

85. Id. at 2215.
86. Id.
87. See Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635 (2nd Cir. 1998); Beart v.
Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998); Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's
Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998); Deas v. River W., 152 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 1998).
88. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
89. See supra note 86.
90. 155 F.3d 775.
91. Id. at 780.
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physiological impact in dormancy are factors indicating that a person
suffers from a "physical impairment."92 However,. in determining
whether plaintiff's disease substantially limited the major life activity
of work, the Sixth Circuit relied on the factors laid out in the EEOC
regulations without mentioning Bragon.9' Similarly, in Baert v. Euclid
Beverage, Ltd., 9" the Seventh Circuit found that while a truck driver
who lost his job because of insulin-dependent diabetes may be "disabled,"
diabetes could not be deemed a disability as a matter of law.95 Rather,
the court held that whether an impairment is a disability and whether
it substantially limits a major life activity requires a case-by-case
inquiry of the kind called for by the EEOC regulations.9 6
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit has cited Bragdon as standing for an
individualized inquiry. In Deas v. River West 97 it held that plaintiff's
seizures were not a per se disability under the ADA and that "awareness" was not a major life activity.98 The court emphasized "the
importance of... making disability determinations on an individualized
basis."99 The court further stated that it has "consistently emphasized
that an individualized, case-by-case determination of disability best
achieves the purposes of the ADA."1"' In a footnote the court stated
that the Supreme Court in Bragdon declined to rule specifically on
whether HIV is a per se disability.'1 The court noted the Supreme
Court conducted an individualized inquiry into whether plaintiff's
infection substantially limited reproduction.102
The court did not,
however, explain how the Supreme Court conducted an individualized
inquiry and did not recite the Court's reasoning.' 0 ' Likewise,, the
Second Circuit held in Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Department'°4
that the inquiry into whether plaintiff's impairment substantially limits
a major life activity is "individualized and fact specific."'0 5 Again, the
court cited Bragdon for this position.0 6

92. Id.
93. Id. at 781.
94. 149 F.3d 626.
95. Id. at 631.
96. Id.
97. 152 F.3d 471.
98. Id. at 482.
99. Id. at 477.
100. Id. at 478.
101. Id. at 478 n.15.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 158 F.3d 635.
105. Id. at 643.
106. Id.

, 642
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Regardless of the methodology, it is evident from the outcomes of most
post-Bragdon litigation that very little has changed in ADA jurisprudence. Rather, it seems possible that the Supreme Court afforded HIV
the same unique status that it receives in modern culture, that of an
unknown, feared disease deserving of special considerations. While
there is certainly no explicit mention of the societal view on HIV in the
opinion, perhaps the Court is protecting the current view that HIV is an
especially debilitating disease deserving of the rarely given title of "per
se" disability under the ADA. Regardless of why the court seemingly
abandoned the individualized inquiry into the final prong of the
disability analysis, the individualized methodology is still alive and well
in other contexts in the circuit courts.
AMY C. REEDER

